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benefit from discussing the issues he raises. The task is to present a more
precise prescription for moving from the present to the resource-conserving future.
Stephen E. Roulac*

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert, eds. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co. 1974. Pp. xxxvii, 1600. $25.00.
In The Spirit of the Common Law, Roscoe Pound summarized the

modem conception of the relationship between law and social change:
A legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, individuals, public and social; by defining the limits within which these
interests shall be recognized legally and given effect through the force
of the state, and by endeavoring to secure the interests so recognized
within the defined limits. It does not create these interests . . . they
arise, apart from the law, through the competition of individuals with
each other and the competition of individuals with such groups or
societies.'
The recent emergence of environmental law well illustrates this process.
In the past decade legislatures and courts have recognized a wide variety
of enviromental interests ranging from the protection of aesthetic
values to the minimization of threats to human health and the stability
of ecosystems. The recognition of environmental interests has been so
rapid and comprehensive that the important issue today, despite our
immediate preoccupation with energy shortages and unemployment, is
not whether to consider environmental values at all but what weight to
give them. This is the essential message of the 1600 pages of Federal
EnvironmentalLaw.
Federal Environmental Law is not a conventional treatise but a
collection of twenty-two essays on federal laws and programs. The
essays' were written under the direction of the Environmental Law
* Lecturer, School of Business Administration & Department of Architecture,
University of California, Berkeley.
R. PouND, THm SPIRIT oF THE COMMON LAw 91-92 (1921).
2. The Chapters of Federal Environmental Law [hereinafter cited as FELl are:
The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law
The Impact of Federal Institutional Arrangements
The Role of the Courts
The National Environmental Policy Act
The Federal Role in Technology Amessment
Federal Procurement and the Environment
1.
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Institute, a public interest organization which publishes the Environmental Law Reporter and sponsors major research projects. The authors
are a group of young (by the standards of a 35 year old reviewer),
environmentally committed lawyers, many of whom have participated in
litigation or other governmental processes involving the topics of their
essays. Some have been employees of the agencies administering the
programs they describe.
A work of scholarship which imposes order on the rapidly developing field of federal environmental law can perform three useful functions. First, federal legislative programs and the judicial decisions which
interpret them can be systematically described and analyzed. Second, the
recent judicial activism of the circuit and district courts particularly can
be evaluated and placed in the perspective of traditional doctrines of
constitutional and administrative law. Third, future resource use conflicts can be identified and the role of the legal system in structuring the
process of decision explored. The Environmental Institute's primary
objectives were to fulfill the first two functions, although, as Frederick
Anderson's preface indicates, some attention was given to the third. This
review will explore the Institute's success in meeting those goals.
Satisfying the first function-describing and analyzing the many
federal programs-mandated the use of separate authors. I know of
no one with the background to write in-depth on all of the topics. The
number of piecemeal federal legislative programs is enormous-ranging
from federal procurement practices to protection of "wild free-roaming
horses and burros"--and the systematic description of them in one place
is enough to justify publication of the book. The survey of federal
energy programs3 and the chapters on marine pollution, 4 coastal development' and water resources developments are particularly good examThe Federal Lands
Wildlife Preservation Under Federal Law
The Control of Marine Pollution
The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control
The Federal Role in Coastal Development
The Federal Law of Water Resources Development
Energy
Radiation and the Environment
The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control
Noise: Emerging Federal Control
Federal Pesticide Law
Solid Waste and Resource Recovery
Federal Environmental Statutes and Transportation
National Land Use Policy
Protection of the Cultural Environment in Federal Law
Federal Law and Population Control
3. Stoel, Energy, FEL 928.
4. Lettow, The Control of Marine Pollution,FEL 596.
5. Power, The Federal Role in Coastal Development, FEL 792.
6. Hillhouse, The Federal Law of Water Resource Development, FEL 844. This
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pies of the benefits of the multi-author approach. These are areas that
have generally been treated elsewhere in a piecemeal fashion and the
more comprehensive treatment ties together a great deal of information
with some fresh perspectives on these important problems. Unfortunately, much of the useful information may be missed by those who do not
read the book in its entirety or come to it with a good grasp of the
subject matter for there is no index. The problems are often interrelated
and the editors have provided some cross-references but the lack of an
index is a major defect in the book.
Two long chapters cover the federal regulatory program for air and
water pollution. 7 These two chapters should be of great interest to
lawyers because their principal governing acts are technical and apply to
many activities. Unfortunately the two chapters provide less guidance
than most lawyers will want. In the case of the chapter on water
pollution this is unavoidable because the application of the statutes will
depend on the construction given them by EPA over the next few years.
The chapter contains a very good survey of the legislative history of the
Federal Water Quality Control Act of 19728 and a concise discussion
of many crucial constructional problems that the EPA must resolve. The
summary of the relevant legislative history will be an especially useful
source of suggested approaches to defining many of the terms Congress
intentionally left vague. In contrast to the younger water pollution effort,
many important issues under the Clean Air Act of 19709 have been
decided, such as the required implementation of a non-degradation
policy, the procedures for informal rulemaking, and the procedures for
contesting EPA decisions. These issues are discussed in the air pollution
chapter but the analysis is insufficient to give the lawyer a useful
framework for approaching these and other problems dealing with the
application of the Act.
The chapter on federal regulation of pesticides"0 suffers from a
different problem. This chapter would have been a good place to take
up the problem of risk-benefit analysis. Instead, the chapter is a critique,
in the best nineteenth century rule-of-law tradition, of the discretion
delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency. Lawyers will find it
an illuminating preview of many of the issues that may be litigated under the statute, but there is little discussion of the substantive standards
Chapter contains the best discussion of judicial review of cost-benefit analysis in the
book. See also Comment, ludicial Review of Cost-Benefit Analysis Under NEPA, 53
NEB. L REV. 540 (1973).
7. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, FEL 682; Jorling, The
Federal Law of Air Pollution Control, FEL 1058.
8. 33 U.S.C. H 1251 et seq. (Supp. IZ,1973).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970).
10. Butler, Federal Pesticide Law, FEL 1232.
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which EPA has developed in its hearings on the cancellation of pesticide
production licenses. Contrary to the somewhat harsh tone of the chapter,
the standards represent a significant recognition of environmental values
and a liberalization of existing concepts of proof of harm." The chapter's critical stance, while certainly historically justified, sometimes detracts from its effectiveness. The author frequently deplores the fact that
the statute is the product of compromise between agricultural and
environmental interests, but it would have been more helpful to examine
the legislative history of the various sections to explain the product of
this compromise. This could have saved the author from occasional
misleading generalizations. 12 The author's major proposal for change
in pesticide management is that the EPA should use a generic approach
to regulation and cancellation of chemicals. This merits more discussion
than the chapter offers. The statute seems to require that the benefits of each use of a pesticide are to be compared to its environmental
and health costs and thus the same chemical may have a different costbenefit ratio for different uses.
Surprisingly, none of these three chapters on federal regulatory
programs gives much attention to the issue of what character and quantum of scientific information is necessary to support a regulation; yet
this is one of the most difficult problems faced by the EPA. The failure
to deal with the difficult legal question of standards for scientific proof
posed by environmental litigation is one of the major weaknesses of the
book. Many law suits now request the prohibition of an activity because it poses a risk of future harm. There is little consensus as to
what level of risk must be established to authorize limitation of an ac11. But see Comment, Farmworkers in Jeopardy: OSHA, EPA, and the Pesticide
Hazard, 5 ECoLoGY L.Q. 69.(1975).
12. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136
(Supp. I, 1973), prohibits EPA from making "any lack of essentiality a criterion for
denying registration of any pesticide." Id. i 136a(c)(5). Mr. Butler states: "This
phraseology was inserted at industry insistence to prevent EPA from denying a registration on the grounds that adequate alternatives already existed." Butler, supra note 10,
at 1239. The legislative history indicates that this is only one possible interpretation
of the term "essentiality."
The doctrine of essentiality has different meanings to different people. To
some, it would forbid the registration of any pesticide if there exists an
alternative which is just as safe and effective as that pesticide-since under
those circumstances the pesticide is not 'essential' for the well-being of
society. Under another reading, the doctrine merely mandates consideration of the availability of less hazardous substitutes as one of the interests
to be balanced in determining whether a pesticide should be registered.
S. Rep. 970, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972).
EPA takes the position that the doctrine means only that it cannot deny a registration solely because another equally effective pesticide has been previously registered. The agency contends that the issue of alternatives is relevant in the cost-benefit analysis it makes to determine whether a pesticide should be registered or a registration canceled. See, Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Suspension of aldrin and dieldrin upheld).
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tivity (especially when a threat to human health is not present), or as
to what amount of proof is necessary to insure that the conclusion
reached is not "speculative" and thus an insufficient basis to uphold
a regulation or support an injunction.18
The book's failure to adequately fulfill the second function-an
analysis of recent judicial activism-illustrates a disadvantage of the
separate author approach, and of the organization of the book into
functional units. In some instances the analysis of emerging doctrines
and important cases benefits from being discussed in several different
contexts. The discussion of the NEPA cases which attempt judicial review of cost-benefit analyses in the chapters on NEPA 4 and on water
resources development 15 is a good example. However, in other instances the fragmentation of treatment by author and subject results
in an inadequate analysis of major legal developments. The broader
doctrinal significance of many important environmental law cases is
missed and lawyers working with these cases in the future will find
Federal Environmental Law of little help in suggesting lines of analysis
and in pointing out arguments that must be overcome.
Grant Thompson's chapter, "The Role of the Courts,"'" only partially corrects this problem by an overview of the new administrative
law. Traditionally relief against administrative action alleged to be
arbitrary has been granted only to those persons affected in a manner
distinct from the general public. In Professor Jaffe's phrase, non-Hohfeldian interests were not recognized.' 7 In recent years administrative
action which affects all members of the public more or less equally has
been subject to increased judicial control through the expansion of
standing (although the fiction of pleading distinct injury is still required) and the imposition of new standards to structure the process of
decisions which have traditionally been considered unreviewable, such
as informal rulemaking. Judicial review generally takes the form of the
imposition of increased procedural requirements on decisionmaking
bodies. The extent to which such new procedural standards ultimately
constrain an administrator in making a decision is not clear. Constraints
are, however, being imposed in a variety of ways and this process is
13.

Compare United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975),

with Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ERC 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and set for argument
before court sitting en banc, 7 ERC 168 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally Gelpe & Tar-

lock, The'Uses of Scientific information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S.
L REv. 371 (1974).

CAL.

14.

Anderson, The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act, FEL 192.

15.

Hillhouse, supra note 6.

16.
17.

Thompson, The Role of the Courts, FEL 192.
Jaffe,. The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions., The Non-Hohfeldlan or

Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L R. 1033 (1968).
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working a significant change in the doctrines of administrative law
which, since the New Deal, have all been premised on confining judicial
intervention.
The primary focus of "The Role of the Courts" is on "the strict
requirements for a full administrative record which have developed for
informal agency rulemaking generally and for informal rulemaking in
environmental cases in particular."18 Judicial review of informal administrative action is the most rapidly developing area of administrative law
due to the large amount of environmental and consumer protection
litigation. The chapter quickly passes over the difficult question of how
much informal action should be reviewed by accepting the question
begging argument of the courts that a full record is necessary for effective judicial review. Since Justice Marshall's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe19 declared that the informal action can
be reviewed, the important and proper question concerns the standards
and scope of that review.
In Overton Park the Supreme Court reviewed the Secretary
of Transportation's decision to approve federal funding of a highway which would run through a public park. Section 4(f) of the
Transportation Act 20 prohibits such locations unless no feasible and
prudent alternative exists. Thompson's discussion of Overton Park correctly emphasizes that the Court interpreted section 4(f) of the Transportation Act, which seemed to delegate considerable discretion in
highway route selection to the Secretary of Transportation, as a statute
in which the values to be weighed by the Secretary had been ranked by
Congress. Thus the precedential value of Overton Park is limited when
applied, for instance, to cases involving review under NEPA since the
statute is drawn much more broadly than section 4(f) of the Transportation Act.2 1 Other authors in the book pass over these problems too
lightly. They unjustifiably assume that Overton Park requires review of
informal action where the delegated discretion is significantly broader.22
18.

Thompson. supra note 16, at 195.

19. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
20.

49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).

21. See Leventhal, Environmental Decilsonmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. Pa. L.R. 509, 512-14, 520 (1974).
22. See Guilbert, Wildlife Preservation Under Federal Law, FEL 551, 566-68.
Discussing recent litigation under the Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act, the author cites
an unpublished Ninth Circuit Memorandum which states that since Overton Park, the
Forest Service must give due consideration to ecological values in making decisions under the Act. The author asserts that if the agency alleges that it has considered adverse
impacts on wildlife "but there is strong evidence that it has ignored or dismissed a preponderance of ecological opinion in favor of other factors, Overton Park, and the Ninth
Circuit's nonprecedential 'memorandum' in Sierra Club v. Butz, No. 71-2514, 3 ELR
20292 (9th Cir. 1973) suggests that this constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. at 568.
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The chapter most directly concerned with the decision, "Federal Environmental Statutes and Transportation," contains a discussion of the
legislative history and the administrative implementation of section 4(f)
and the construction placed on it by the Court in Overton Park but no
general discussion of the impact of the decision. 8
Thompson's chapter could have been supplemented by a planned
chapter on citizen involvement in administrative proceedings and judicial review. Unfortunately the chapter was not finished in time to be
included. One of the most distinctive contributions of administrative
law, as illustrated by writings of Sax and others,2 4 has been to justify the
use of parties not specially affected by a decision as overseers of the
administrative and, to a lesser extent, the legislative process. The
planned chapter would have been a significant opportunity to identify
some of the potentially lasting contributions of environmental law by
placing recent developments in a broader context. °
The book could have been much improved by a stronger effort to
fulfill the third function-the identification and analysis of future resource use conflicts. The two chapters most in need of a projective
treatment are those on technology assessment 25 and national land use
policy. 26 Technology assessment is just emerging as a discrete field of
inquiry and there are fascinating problems ranging from philosophical
questions about our ability to humanize technology to more technical
questions about the placement of the burden of proof. Speth's chapter
covers well the tentative federal efforts in this direction and major
technology assessment litigation to date. However, his call for an independent technology assessment agency is a rather sterile solution to a
much more complex problem. Happily, William Lake's chapter, "Noise:
Emerging Federal Control,"' 2 is a model technology assessment case
study and is useful reading for those interested in problems other than
noise.
The problem of land use regulation is of a different order than that
of technology assessment. An elaborate body of land use regulation now
exists. Conventional zoning and subdivision regulations have traditionalThis may be a good argument for an environmental plaintiff, but it represents a significant extension of Overton Park. The Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16
U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1970) is significantly different from section 4(f) because the delegated discretion is much less structured and thus the case posed by the author can be
easily distinguished from Overton Park.
23. Vardaman, Federal Environmental Statutes and Transportation, FEL 1316,
1370-88.
24. See, e.g., 3. SAx, DEPENDiNo Tma ENvmoiNmcr (1971); Jaffe, supra note 17.
25. Speth, The Federal Role In Technology Assessment and Control, FEL 420.
26. Reilly, National Land Use Policy, FEL 1414.
27. Lake, Noise: Emerging Federal Control, FEL 1150.
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ly had limited environmental and consumer protective objectives as they
have been premised on the assumption that growth will occur and the
role of the law is to guide it gently by coordinating private and public
choices. Environmental land use regulation on the other hand seeks to
withdraw land from development and preserve ecologically sensitive
areas (such as shorelines), thereby channeling growth into sharply
compressed corridors. These objectives are a radical departure from
those of traditional land use control and present a host of new problems
for the lawyer. Environmental objectives also conflict with other social
policies such as the provision of housing opportunities for low and
moderate income families,"8 and to complicate matters further, it is not
possible to establish uniform environmental standards for land use, by
using concepts such as the "carrying capacity" of land, as has been done
with air and water pollution. Somehow on top of this existing structure
of regulation a new superstructure must be imposed. It is unlikely that
federal or state governments will take over all local land development
regulation, but, some redistribution of power to higher levels of government is required. There is already a growing body of special purpose
land regulation at the state level, such as power plant siting procedures,
and these must be meshed with new forms of general land use regulation.
William Reilly's chapter, "National Land Use Policy," is a sensitive
introduction to these problems. Conventional land use controls are
contrasted with newly emerging theories through discussion of the tortuous progress of national land use planning legislation, EPA's tentative
steps into planning, and the American Law Institute's proposed Model
Land Development Code.29 The chapter makes a substantial contribution to the literature by examining the increasingly used but little
understood concept of "critical areas."80 However, the chapter merely
brushes the surface of land use problems and must be considered a brief
introduction.
One problem which Reilly's chapter neglects is the tension between
traditional theories of planning and the adjudicatory thrust of much
environmental legislation along with judicial constructions of that legislation. In theory, planning is a process which makes major allocation
choices in advance of a specific conflict. By contrast environmental
litigation involves a detailed review of a specific allocation choice.,It is
often alleged that lawsuits are necessary because prior planning has been
insufficiently comprehensive or sensitive to environmental problems,
28. See Tarlock, Book Review, 83 YALE L.. 637 (1974).
29. ALT, MODEL Ltw DEvELoPmENT CODE (Tent Drafts 1-6, 1968-74).
30. Reilly, supra note 26, at 1449-61; see Mandelker, Critical Area Controls: A
New Dimension in American Land Development Regulation, 41 AIP J. 21 (1975).
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and that the litigation will force agencies to do their jobs properly.
Instead, the litigation has sometimes encouraged a tendency to rely on a
judicial solution. As Charles Reich observed in his classic study, "The
Law of Planned Society,"8 1 the use of ad hoc balancing decisions results
in the consideration of a narrower range of factors than would be
considered in devising a comprehensive plan. There is, however, widespread distrust of administrative decisionmaking and little confidence in
the ability of the legislatures in this area. Thus the judiciary is being
increasingly relied upon to resolve environmental issues and states have
attempted to split the planning process into legislative and judicial
components. For example, many states experimenting with "critical
areas" legislation allow general guidelines to be established by rulemaking but require adjudicatory procedures when the guidelines are applied
to specific tracts.2 2 This split simply preserves the fundamental tension
between planning and the case-by-case balancing that is at the heart of
NEPA litigation. 8 Ultimately this approach to conflict resolution will
have to be harmonized with the loose theories of comprehensive planning that underlie much of the new state and proposed federal land
use controls legislation.8"
A major element of national land use policy will be the coordination of federal management of public lands with the use of privately and
state owned lands. Jerome Muys's chapter, "The Federal Lands," 8 is a
starting point for understanding the issues that will arise in this effort. In
addition to accurately summarizing the myriad of public land classifications, the chapter concentrates on the Report of the Public Land Law
Review Commission. 6 The Commission's report coincided with the first
wave of environmental power and its comprehensive perspective has
often been ignored. Mr. Muys's thesis that "the Commission's report
presents the only reasonably coherent, comprehensive, and balanced
starting point available for initiating long overdue [reform]" ' is worth
considering. The land use chapters are supplemented by Elliott's "Federal Law and Population Control."38 The chapter is a concise and lucid
but wide-ranging summary of current methods of population control
Reich, The Law of PlannedSociety, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
See Mandelker, supra note 30.
33. This tension is well described in J. SAX, DEammNG THm ENmONMENT 100107 (1971).
34. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'n, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23
(1973).
35. Muys, The Federal Lands, FEL 492.
36. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND
(1970).
37. Muys, supra note 35, at 544.
31.
32.

38. Elliott, FederalLaw and Population Control, FEL 1518,
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and their relationship to environmental management strategies. Both
macro- topics, such as federal immigration policy and the debate over
what is an optimum level of world as well as national population, and
micro- topics, such as voluntary and compulsory sterilization, are covered. The discussion of the role of federal and state governments in
influencing population distribution is the most interesting part of the
chapter, for it breaks new ground. The chapter raises the various
constitutional issues, such as the basis of the right to travel, which will
arise if there are direct efforts to control where people can live in the
name of resource conservation and amenity preservation, but the discussion stops short of thorough analysis. For example, more discussion of
control of resource use and access as a means of influencing population
distribution would have been helpful.
To end on a positive note, I can say that two chapters are first rate
in every respect. A detailed critique of Professor Philip Soper's chapter,
"The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law,"39 and Frederick Anderson's, "The National Environmental Policy Act, ' 40 would
require separate reviews of their own. Both chapters are outstanding examples of scholarship. Many lawyers will be familiar with Mr. Anderson's chapter as it is partially a condensation and revision of his excellent
book NEPA in the Courts.4 It is also an extension of his book since the
chapter has a significant new emphasis. "Making his cue from Judge
Wright's review of the book, the author has emphasized the institutions
which implement NEPA, the outer limits of the new authority conferred
upon the agencies by NEPA, the fullness of the agency's consideration
of the impact statement (once it is clear that a statement of an appropriate scope must be prepared), and the conformance of the- agency's
actual decision to proceed with NEPA's substantive provisions." 42 "The
Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law" is an exhaustive
analysis of constitutional issues from the obvious to the obscure. Two
important questions which are considered are.the distinction between a
police power regulation and a taking, and the recognition of fundamental environmental rights. One will not always agree with Soper's analysis,
but I think the reader will find it consistently insightful, even on
problems which ordinarily defy analysis in less than a separate volume.
If Federal Environmental Law is not the comprehensive overview
and analysis that many of us would like, it is still a very worthwhile
effort. The major defects are its uneven quality and an overlapping and
39.
40.

Soper, The ConstitutionalFramework of Environmental Law, FEL 20.
Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, FEL 238.

41.

F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRnS (1973).

42.

Anderson, The NationalEnvironmentalpolicy Act, FEL 238, 241.
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fragmented treatment of many problems. On balance these defects are
outweighed by its comprehensiveness, wealth of useful information,
and its several excellent chapters.
A. Dan Tarlock*

CLEARING THE AIR: FEDERAL POLICY ON AUTOMOTIVE EMISSIONS CONTROL. By Henry D. Jacoby, John D. Steinbruner, et. al. Cambridge,
Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company. 1973. Pp. xvii, 215. $15.00.
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION CASE.

By Donald N. Dewees. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 1974. Pp. x, 214.
$18.50.
The standards, deadlines, and enforcement methods established by
the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act for the control of motor
vehicle emissions continue to generate controversy. Two'studies reviewed here fault the present policy of strict standards and prohibitory
fines, and recommend that the Clean Air Act be further amended to
establish a schedule of fines large enough to stimulate technological
improvements but small enough not to stop vehicle production. After
summarizing and comparing these studies' estimates of the costs and
benefits of emissions controls, of the cost-effectiveness of alternative
control strategies, and their proposals for reform, this review will suggest how the present language of the Amendments could support a de
facto emissions tax program without additional legislation.
I.

THE COST OF MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION

What price does the nation pay for air pollution damage from
motor vehicles? In Jacoby's and Steinbruner's view the health cost falls
within one order of magnitude-between $2.1 and 21 billion per year
(1967).2 Dewees is somewhat more confident, and more conservative,
in estimating a range of $1.3 to 3.4 billion per year (1970)8 Dewees
*

Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.

A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965

Stanford University.
1j 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq.
(Supp. 1975).
2. H. JACOBY & J. STEINRUNER, et al., CLEARiO THE AM: FEDr.RAL Poucy ON
ATrroMom'E EMIsoNs 203 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CLE ANG THE Ant].

3. D. DEwuns, EcoNzobcs AND PuRLIc PoLwcy:

ThE AUToMOBILE PoLLuTION

CAmB 34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as EcoNomics AND PuBuc PoLIcy].

